Sparsely Supported Correlated Equilibrium

by Dr Ratnik Gandhi (School of Technology and Computer Science)

Friday 22 Jun 2012, 15:00 → 16:30 Asia/Kolkata

A-212 (STCS Seminar Room) (Colaba Campus)

Correlated equilibria are a generalization of Nash equilibria. Existence of a correlated equilibrium is guaranteed due to existence of a Nash equilibrium. In this talk I will present a result of Germano & Lugosi(2007) that shows every finite normal form game possesses a sparsely supported correlated equilibrium. Ref: Fabrizio Germano & Gábor Lugosi, 2007. "Existence of Sparsely Supported Correlated Equilibria," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 575-578, September.